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The Nature of the Wall
The State and Private Schools
MERLE WILNA FLEMING
IN THIS COUNTRY, or at least in this state, most of us take
for granted that a child will go to school, a graded school
known as "K through 12." It will be, most often, a public school,
but it may be a private or parochial school. Do we assume that
each child has a right to an education? When did each child
acquire such a right? Or does it exist? What kind of education?
Who will make certain that each child gets an education? Most
of us, I believe, take as given that children will be educated. But
the answers to these questions are not so clear, and there is no
end to the complexities when we consider any aspect of edu-
cation.
As we consider the nature of the wall between the state
and private schools, the perspective with which we consider
the issues merits attention. Are we concerned with the rights
or interest of the child? Are we more concerned with the
rights or interest of the parents? Are we concerned with the
interests of the entities that operate private schools? Or are
we concerned with the interest of the state in the education
of the child? The rights or interests of the child, the parent,
the schools, and society may be identical, may overlap, or
may be conflicting. It is from conflicts among those interests
that litigation arises.
The United States Supreme Court has decided many con-
stitutional issues pertaining to the education of children. Some
important principles that emerge may be familiar; some princi-
ples provide a foundation for understanding the constitutional
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issues relevant to state regulation of private schools. Much of
the authority to develop educational systems has been left to
the states. Constitutional principles are created when specific
statutes, regulations, or policies are challenged.
The first principle that seems to me of grave importance
is that education in the abstract is not a child's fundamental
right.i Yet once a public school has been established, the
child's right to access to that institution cannot be denied.
Segregation of children by race does violate the United States
Constitution.2 The United States Supreme Court, in deciding
Brown v. Board of Education, said that "today, education is per-
haps the most important function of state and local govern-
ments."^ The Court has also ruled that states may not exclude
children of illegal aliens from public schools.* Thus, the
Court has emphasized the overwhelming importance of edu-
cation for a child in this nation.^ Where states have estab-
lished a public school, the right of access to education is so
crucial that it rises to the level of a property or liberty interest
of such magnitude that a child cannot be suspended from
public school for as much as ten days without "some kind of
hearing" under the due process clause.*
Whereas education for the child is not a fundamental right,
parents do have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of
children under their control, including a right to send children
to a private or parochial school should they so prefer.'' In con-
1. San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
2. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). The Iowa Supreme Court
banned school segregation in Iowa schools eighty-six years before Brown in
Clark V. Board of Directors, 24 Iowa 266 (1868). The Iowa ruling was based on
the language of the Iowa Constitution of 1856, which requires that education
be provided for "all the youths" of the state. Iowa Const., Art. IX, § 12. See
also Smith v. Directors, 40 Iowa 518 (1875). Under Iowa's first constitution
and the statutes, school segregation was actually required. See Arnie Cooper,
'A Stony Road: Black Education in Iowa, 1838-1860," Annals of Iowa 48
(Winter/Spring 1986), 113-34.
3. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
4. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982).
5. Ibid, at 221-24.
6. Goss V. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
7. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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trast, a constitutional right to educate children at home does not
exist.^  Parental rights are not absolute.'
On issues affecting separation of church and state arising
from the First Amendment to the federal Constitution, school
prayer and the posting of the Ten Commandments in public
schools violate the establishment clause.'" Covernment aid to
parochial schools, including aid for parochial school teachers
and instruction by public school teachers in a parochial school,
has also been determined to violate the establishment clause."
On the other hand, aid to the parent or child for transportation
or secular textbooks does not.'^
States may not prohibit the teaching of foreign language in
public schools, a notion that seems archaic now.'^ If states
receive federal aid for special education, a child in need of spe-
cial education is entitled to a "free appropriate education," and
that right carries with it a host of procedural protections.^^
All fifty states do have public school systems even though
the United States Constitution does not require them. Laws and
8. In Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), the U.S. Supreme Court
observed that "the State's interest in assuring that these standards are being
met has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept instruction
at home as compliance with compulsory education statutes." Ibid, at 246,
247, citing People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 R2d 685 (1953), app.
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question, 347 U.S. 972 (1954). For
more recent cases, see Duro v. District Attorney, 712 E2d 96 (4th Cir. 1983),
cert, denied, 465 U.S. 1006 (1984); Burrow v. State, 282 Ark. 479, 669 S. W.2d
441 (1984); State v. Edgington, 663 R2d 374 (N.M. 1983), cert, denied, 464 U.S.
940, Hanson v. Cushman, 490 E Supp. 109 (W.D. Mich. 1980); Scoma v. Chi-
cago Board of Education, 391 E Supp. 452 (N.D. 111. 1974); State v. Riddle, 285
S.E.2d 359 (W.Va. 1981); In Interest of Sawyer, 672 R2d 1093 (Kan. 1983).
9. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (upholding vaccination
requirement); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (upholding child
labor laws).
10. Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham,
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
11. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349
(1975); Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
12. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Board of Education v.
Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
13. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq. (known as the Education for Handicapped Act);
Iowa Code § 281.6 (1987).
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regulations creating those public school systems are varied. ^ ^
Implied by the title of this article is the notion of regulation of
private schools by the state. The truth is that the extent of the
regulation of private schools in the fifty states also varies
accordingly. Regulation varies from none at all to
substantial.
WHAT DOES THE CONSTITUTION REQUIRE and what
does the Constitution permit or prohibit when states regulate
the operation of private schools? Those constitutional issues are
closely related to the operation of compulsory attendance laws.
Therefore, attention to the development of compulsory educa-
tion is necessary before we can examine the constitutional
issues that have arisen in Iowa.
The first compulsory attendance law in the United States
was adopted by Massachusetts in 1852, though a public school
system had existed in Massachusetts as early as 1671.^* The
Iowa Supreme Court recognized the reasons for such a compul-
sory education law in 1871 in Burdick v. Babcock. There the
court observed that the object of schools is "to secure education
to the children of the State."^^ Compulsory education laws were
recognized as benefiting children as part of the general welfare
of society. Burdick came long before the Iowa compulsory edu-
cation law, child labor laws, special education laws, and the
host of other protective legislation governing the rights and
welfare of children. ^ ^ The children in Burdick had been expelled
under school rules for excessive absences. At that time parents
claimed that they were entitled to the services of their children.
In other words, children had the status of chattel. In upholding
the school rules, the court said, "If the education of children
were compulsory upon parents, who could be reached by
proper penalties, as for an offense for failure to send their chil-
15. An extensive discussion of the variety in state regulation of private
schools is available in W. D. Valente, Education Law Public and Private,
§§ 21.4-.6 (1985) (West). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 226, note
15 (1972).
16. 1852 Massachusetts Acts and Resolves, ch. 240; Massachusetts Colonial
Laws, 136, 305.
17. Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa 562 (1871).
18. See Iowa Code Index (1987) for a list of statutes pertaining to children.
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dren to school, in that case the child could be relieved from the
hardship of expulsion, and the parent made responsible for his
acts in detaining him from school."^^
The first compulsory attendance bill was introduced in the
Iowa legislature in 1872, the year after Burdick v. Babcock was
decided by the Iowa Supreme Court. But Iowa did not enact
such a law until 1902, when it became the thirty-third state to
adopt such legislation.^" The 1902 statute was a simple one, but
it contained the essential features that still exist in current law.
Parents were required to cause children, age 7 to 14, with some
exceptions, to attend a public, private, or parochial school for a
given number of days per year. As an alternative, a child could
"attend upon equivalent instruction by a competent teacher
elsewhere than [in a] school." The bill also specified the courses
to be taught: reading, writing, spelling, arithmetic, grammar,
geography, physiology, and United States history.^ ^
Violation of the statute was to be a misdemeanor, and con-
viction could result in a fine of not less than three dollars nor
more than twenty doUars.^ ^ Penalties for violating the law were
imposed on parents, not on private or parochial schools. Princi-
pals of private and parochial schools and parents who educated
children "privately" were asked to report to the school district
the names, ages, and attendance of their pupils, but failure to
report was not yet designated as a crime. Public school officials.
19. Burdick v. Babcock, 31 Iowa at 569.
20. For an account of the forces that produced the Iowa compulsory atten-
dance law, see Carroll Engelhardt, "Compulsory Education in Iowa, 1872-
1919," Annals of Iowa 49 (Summer/Fall 1987), 58-76. The same issue of the
Annals of Iowa contains a detailed description of the elementary and secon-
dary public school system of Iowa in 1900. See Keach Johnson, "The State of
Elementary and Secondary Education in Iowa in 1900," Annals of Iowa
(Summer/Fall 1987), 26-57.
21. 1902 Iowa Acts, ch. 128, § 1. Cf. Iowa Code, ch. 299 (1987).
22. Ibid., § 6. In general, the penalties for violating compulsory attendance
laws have been harsher in other states than in Iowa. For example, fines of five
hundred dollars and up to a year in jail upon conviction for violation of the
compulsory attendance law were provided for in Virginia. Rice v. Common-
wealth, 188 Va. 224 (1948). For current Virginia law, see 5 Code of Virginia
§ 22.1-254 et seq. (1985). That law permits home instruction, subject to
extensive regulation. Violation of the compulsory education law is a misde-
meanor. Parents may also be subject to laws having to do with children "in
need of services." Ibid., § 22.1-262.
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on the other hand, were mandated to enforce the law; if they
failed to do so, they were liable for a fine of not less than ten
dollars nor more than twenty dollars for each offense. Public
school officials were also obliged to take a census, to determine
the number of children who did not attend school, and, if pos-
sible, to determine the cause of truancy. ^ ^
Between 1902 and 1924 some changes were made. In 1904
coverage was expanded to include children to age 16 or until
completion of the eighth grade, and in 1909 the number of days
of attendance was increased to 120.^'' In 1924, following
amendments to the law, the code editor moved the list of sub-
jects to be taught from the compulsory attendance chapter and
placed it in a code chapter entitled Courses of Study. In 1931
the history of Iowa was added to the list of required courses.^^
There is a gap in available information about compulsory
education cases in Iowa's trial courts. However, historian
Carroll Engelhardt has reviewed school statistics gathered and
reported by the state superintendent and concluded that
"despite spotty enforcement during its early years, the new law
did produce increased attendance." After 1932 the number of
non-attenders was no longer reported in the school statistics by
the state department.^* We simply do not know how many par-
ents were convicted for violations. State trial court rulings are
neither published nor granted precedential value. Misdemean-
ors were tried by justices of the peace in townships, in mayors'
courts, and in other lower courts. A unified court system and
the collection of court statistics came later.^ ^
There is no doubt, however, that most children in Iowa
attended school. The quality of education may have varied.
23. 1902 Iowa Acts, ch. 128, §§ 1, 2, 9.
24. 1904 Iowa Acts, ch. 116, § 1; 1909 Iowa Acts, ch. 186.
25. 1931 Iowa Acts, ch. 92. From 1924 through 1939, the compulsory atten-
dance law appears at ch. 228, §§ 4410-32 in the Iowa Code. Ch. 214, § 4252
(1939) lists the common school studies and notes that 40 Ex. GA, S.F. I l l ,
§ 1, was editorially divided.
26. Engelhardt, "Compulsory Education," 73.
17. For the variety of courts in Iowa in, for example, 1962, see Iowa Code,
ch. 231, 367, 601, 602, 603, 604, and 631 (1962). In that year Article V of the
Iowa Constitution was amended to alter the process for selecting supreme
court justices and district court judges by adding new sections 15,16,17, and
18.
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One-room schools, K-8, taught by a single teacher, nine per
township, were a part of the rural landscape.^^ City and town
school districts were more likely to provide high school educa-
tion.^' In due course the right to a tax-supported high school
education evolved; districts lacking high schools paid tuition for
the children who resided in that district to attend high schools
in other districts.^"
Lawyers commonly look to statutes and court decisions to
determine what the law requires. Between 1902 and 1981,
however, the Iowa Supreme Court decided only one compul-
sory attendance case: in 1937, in State v. Ghrist, the Iowa court
upheld the school district's power to designate the institution
that a special education student would be obliged to attend.^^
The constitutionality of compulsory attendance laws was
upheld elsewhere.^^ The guiding constitutional principles with
respect to compulsory education law appear in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters (1925) and Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). A companion
case, Bartels v. Iowa, was decided with Meyer.^^
In 1922 the voters of Oregon adopted by referendum a law
that required parents, guardians, or other persons in control of
children age 8 to 16 to send them to a public school. Several
cases had been brought by a parochial school operated by the
Society of Sisters and a private military academy. The Court
enjoined enforcement of the statute and ruled that the Oregon
law 'unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and
28. For the structure and governance of rural school districts in the past, see,
for example, Iowa Code, ch. 208 (1935).
29. A detailed account of the early history of education in Iowa in five vol-
umes was published by the State Historical Society of Iowa beginning in
1914. The first volume describes the development of school districts and the
adoption of the free school law. See C. R. Aurner, History of Education in Iowa
(Iowa City, 1914), vol. 1. Johnson, "The State of Elementary arid Secondary
Education in Iowa in 1900," also calls attention to the disparities between
rural and urban education.
30. Iowa Code §§ 4275-78 (1927).
31. State V. Ghrist, 111 Iowa 1069, 270 N.W. 276 (1937).
32. See, for example. Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159 Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402
(1893), and State v. Jackson, 71 N.H. 552, 53 A. 1021 (1902).
33. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 403 (1923). In Meyer the U.S.
Supreme Court ruled that the teaching of modern foreign languages to chil-
dren could not be prohibited. 262 U.S. at 403.
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guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.'^*
Thus Pierce stands for the principle that parents have a
fundamental right or liberty to enroll children in a private
school and cannot be compelled to send them to a public
school.^ 5 But Pierce and Meyer also affirmed the power of states
to adopt reasonable regulations to require that children of
proper age attend school, that private schools teach certain sub-
jects, and that states may regulate those who teach.^^ Succinctly
put: children may attend private schools, but states may impose
reasonable regulations on those schools. In Lemon v. Kurtzman
(1971), the Court said, "A state always has a legitimate concern
for maintaining minimum standards in all schools it allows to
operate."^^
THE PHRASE IN THE TITLE "the nature of the wall" refers
to a metaphor from Thomas Jefferson, who once described "a
wall of separation between church and state.'^s The United
States Supreme Court has used the metaphor, but justices have
expressed some dissatisfaction with it. Justice Burger wrote,
"Judicial caveats against entanglement must recognize that the
line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred, indis-
tinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of
a particular relationship.'^' The wall-of-separation metaphor
and the term freedom of religion oversimplify the two religious
clauses of the First Amendment. Cases or issues asserted under
the establishment clause require an analysis that is quite differ-
ent from the analysis in free exercise disputes.
34. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. at 530-35.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid., and Meyer.
37. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
38. The quotation from Jefferson appears in Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S.
145,164 (1879), cited in Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1,16 (1947).
In Reynolds, the case in which a law prohibiting polygamy was upheld, the
court said, "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they can-
not interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with prac-
tices." Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 166.
39. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. at 614.
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In Lemon v. Kurtzman the United States Supreme Court
enunciated the test to be used in deciding establishment clause
cases as follows: "First, the statute must have a secular legisla-
tive purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must be one
that neither advances nor inhibits religion; . . . finally, the stat-
ute must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement
with religion.'"'"' The vitality of that test has been reaffirmed
repeatedly in the years since Lemon was decided.'*^
The applicable analysis in free exercise cases is more com-
plex. The preliminary framework was set out in Sherbert v.
Verner (1963), which provided a two-pronged analysis. First,
does application of the statute constitute an infringement upon
the individual's religious liberty? (Both direct and indirect bur-
dens may be considered.) Second, is the burden imposed by
challenged statutes justified by a compelling state interest?"^
The Court, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, expanded the first prong of
Sherbert to inquire whether the religious activity at issue was
motivated by and rooted in a sincerely held religious belief that
is central to the religion.''^ The centrality aspect of the Yoder
analysis requires a determination of fact.''''
The next step in the analysis of whether a burden exists is
an issue of law.*^  If a burden is cast on the central beliefs by reg-
ulations, then the state must show it has a compelling interest
in the purpose the regulations seek to accomplish. If a court
determines that a sincere, deeply rooted religious belief is at
stake in conduct that is regulated pursuant to a compelling state
interest, the court then engages in a balancing process. The pur-
pose of the balancing process is to determine whether the bur-
den imposed is justified by the compelling state interest.*^ In
40. Ibid., citing Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968), and
VVfl/z V. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
41. See, for example, Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985); Grand Rapids
School Dist. V. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985).
42. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-8 (1963).
43. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-18 (1972).
44. Attorney General v. Bailey, 436 N.E.2d 139,145 (Mass. 1982), cert, denied,
sub nom. Bailey v. Bellotti, 459 U.S. 970.
45. Ibid., 436 N.E.2d at 146.
46. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 204, 214-16 (1972).
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cases in which a court has found that a compelling state interest
is not at stake, the regulation falls with ease.*'' If the court deter-
mines that the compelling state interest outweighs the burden
on religious belief or activity, the religious belief must give
way.*^ If the court finds, as a matter of law, that the burden on
religious belief outweighs the compelling state interest, the
court then determines whether the compelling state interest can
be met in a less drastic way, that is, by other means.*^ In Yoder,
the Court decided that the compelling interest of the state in
requiring attendance beyond eighth grade was overcome by
Amish religious beliefs and practices. Moreover, the interests of
the state in the education of the children were met by the
Amish through their own vocational education in their isolated
farming community.5°
In summary, the test is (1) whether the religious belief
asserted to be infringed is central; (2) whether such an interest
is burdened; (3) whether the regulation serves a compelling
state interest that outweighs the burden on religion; and, if
plaintiffs prevail on the first three prongs, (4) whether a less
drastic means is available to serve the compelling state
interest.5^ Other constitutional issues arise in connection with
regulation of private or church schools and require other ana-
lytical approaches.52 Further, cases pertaining to statutes that
accommodate religious organizations or the conduct of individ-
uals require additional analytical concepts.^^
It is not a wall between church and state; it is a great thorny
thicket. The Court has said, "Our prior holdings do not call for
total separation between church and state; total separation is
47. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407.
48. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982).
49. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. at 407.
50. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 224-26, 234-36.
51. For a complete summary and application of the free exercise analysis, see
Síflíe V. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883, 887-900 (N.D. 1980).
52. The U.S. Supreme Court uses a very strict analytical approach if a chal-
lenge to a statute or policy is based on an alleged burden or injury of a funda-
mental right. For a discussion of the court's analysis of constitutional issues,
see Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional Law (Mineóla, NY, 1978).
53. See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982); Gillette v.
United States, 401 U.S. 437, 451-52 (1971).
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not possible in an absolute sense. Some relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable.'^^ Some
private schools resist any regulation.^^ Other private schools
and their patrons seek relationships with states in order to
obtain benefits.^^ The constitutional decisions form an intricate
tangle. And there is the political thicket.^'' Most state laws now
regulate private schools/or less than the Constitution permits.^*
THE FIRST MAJOR INSTANCE OF RESISTANCE to
Iowa's compulsory attendance law was the Amish contro-
versy. ^ ^ The Amish were among the early settlers in Iowa in the
middle of the nineteenth century. Most were farmers. Amish
and Mennonite children went to the rural one-room public
schools and were taught by teachers with certificates.^" Further,
the Amish and Mennonites were concentrated in particular
54. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614.
55. See cases listed at n. 88 below.
56. Aid for secular textbooks (see Iowa Code § 301.30 [1987]), aid for trans-
portation (see Iowa Code § 285.3 [1987]), and tuition tax credits (see 1987
Iowa Acts, ch. 233, §§ 493, 494) are examples of such benefits.
57. Vigorous lobbying efforts in Nebraska led to amendments in the
Nebraska law. The Iowa General Assembly has been subjected to similar
pressure.
58. For example. North Dakota and Nebraska laws which required approval
of private schools by the state were upheld. State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220
(N.D. 1982), cert, denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v.
Faith Baptist Church, 107 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, appeal dismissed, 454
U.S. 803 (1981). See also Murphy v. Arkansas, 852 F2d 1039, 1042 (8th Cir.
1988).
59. As one who grew up in an area heavily populated by Amish and Men-
nonites and who attended school with Amish and Mennonite children, the
Amish controversy in Iowa was puzzling. My role as a lawyer in the recent
cases related to the controversy is an aspect of my life that I can only regard
as ironic. I was neither Amish nor Mennonite and so I was different, with all
the results that descend on a child who is different—name calling, physical
abuse, and all the rest. Most of the teachers in grade school were Mennonite.
The women teachers wore "coverings." Further, the superintendent-teacher
of the two-teacher high school. Center High School, Washington Township,
Johnson County, was Mennonite during my high school years.
60. See Iowa Code §§ 1766-69 (1873) for the statute authorizing examination
of applicants and issuance of teacher certificates by the county superinten-
dent. Iowa Code § 1771 (1873) permitted a county superintendent to revoke a
certificate after an investigation, notice to the teacher, and an opportunity for
the teacher to be present and make a defense.
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areas.*' Therefore, the Mennonite farmers were the school
board members in those rural districts in which they lived.
Given the historical fact that public school teachers in Amish
communities held certificates, the commentary that attributes
most of the Amish controversy to their strong objections to
state-certified teachers is subject to doubt.^^ Rather, the back-
ground of legislative change in 1967 led to the religious exemp-
tion from the Iowa compulsory education law which came to be
known as the Amish exemption."
Pressure to improve schools was strong after World War II.
In 1953 drastic changes were enacted.^ Selection of the state
superintendent changed from a partisan election to appoint-
ment by the state board. The process for selecting the state
board also changed. The superintendent was directed to prom-
ulgate minimum standards, including the subjects that were
required to be taught. The superintendent also was directed to
formulate an approval process for public schools. Private
schools could seek approval, but such approval was not
required and is not required now.^^ The teacher certification
process changed as well.^ ^ Educational qualifications for teach-
61. For a discussion of the culture of Iowa's Old Order Amish communities,
see Dorothy Schwieder and Elmer Schwieder, A Peculiar People: Iowa's Old
Order Amish (Ames, 1975). The concentration of the Amish and Mennonite
population.continues. See the maps ibid., 4 (for Iowa) and 140 (for the
Midwest).
62. See, for example, Donald A. Erickson, "Showdown at an Amish School-
house: A Description and Analysis of the Iowa Controversy," in Public Con-
trols for Nonpublic Schools, ed. Donald A. Erickson (Chicago, 1969), 15,53.
63. 1967 Iowa Acts, ch. 248, codified as Iowa Code § 299.24 (1987).
64. 1953 Iowa Acts, ch. 114-21.
65. 1953 Iowa Acts, ch. 114, §§ 1-5, 11, 18. Cf. Iowa Code Supps. §
256.11(10), (11), and (12) (1987). The main connection to a private school in
Iowa that is not approved is Iowa Code § 299.3 (1987), which requires a princi-
pal of a private school to file reports. Nonpublic schools may seek approval
or accreditation, but, except for the sanction of removal from the list of
accredited schools, there is no penalty for schools that are not approved. In
contrast, a public school district that fails to meet accreditation standards will
be merged with another district. Iowa Code § 256.11(12).
66. The 1953 legislation established the State Board of Public Instruction as the
Board of Educational Examiners and authorized the board to adopt rules for cer-
tification of teachers. 1953 Iowa Acts, ch. 14, § 10(11). R)r the history of the shift
from teacher licensing by the county superintendent to the State Board of Exam-
iners, see C. R. Aurner, History of Education in Iowa, 1: 297-335.
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ers increased.^^ Moreover, the reference to private schools was
deleted from the first paragraph of section 299.1 of the Iowa
Code, leaving the requirement that children attend public
school. The alternative for parents in the statute referred to all
education that was not in public school. Thus the statute met the
Pierce principle that parents cannot be required to send children
to public school. The term competent teacher was changed to
certified teacher.^^
Other great changes flowed from those contained in the
reorganization law of 1953. The legislature declared that it was
the policy of the state to encourage reorganization. In 1957 the
statement of policy became a mandate that all areas of the state
be in a high school district by July 1, 1962. The one-room
school was disappearing. In 1965 the deadline for reorganiza-
tion was moved up to July 1, 1966.*^ Thus, the one-room Iowa
public school became extinct about fifteen years after the pas-
sage of the reorganization law of 1953.
It was in that post-1953 era that the Amish resisted school
laws, particularly in the Hazleton-Oelwein area when reorgani-
zation efforts began there.^'' A Des Moines Register photogra-
pher won a Pulitzer Prize for a posed picture of Amish children
scattering into corn fields to avoid a school bus.''^ That picture
has become part of a great Iowa myth, using the word myth
properly as symbolic truth. It was a great media event.
During the months that it took for a blue-ribbon commit-
tee to propose a bill and for the General Assembly to act, the
Amish children in the Hazleton area attended a private school
67. Qualifications for teachers changed over time. Various classes of certifi-
cates were authorized based on the education of the teacher. See, for exam-
ple, Iowa Code, ch. 260 (1946).
68. 1953 Iowa Acts, ch. 114, § 41.
69. 1953 Iowa Acts, ch. 117, § 1; 1957 Iowa Acts, ch. 128, § 1; 1965 Iowa
Acts, ch. 240, § 1.
70. The controversy was described in detail by Erickson, "Showdown at an
Amish Schoolhouse," 15-60. The connection to reorganization is clear.
Erickson testified on behalf of the Amish at the Wisconsin v. Yoder trial (see
below). A more objective description of the controversy appears in
Schwieder and Schwieder, A Peculiar People, 94-127.
71. The photograph by Thomas DeFoe first appeared on page one of the Des
Moines Register, 20 November 1965. It was reprinted in Schwieder and
Schwieder, A Peculiar People, 94-95.
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taught by certified teachers who were paid by funds provided
by The Danforth Foundation of St. Louis.''^  In my view, the
Iowa Amish objected to children being transported to town and
school, away from the community, and to the exposure to
worldly influences.^^
The Amish exemption was adopted before a similar con-
troversy was resolved in Wisconsin. There, the Amish objected
to a Wisconsin requirement that children attend school until
age 16, which usually meant two years of high school.^'' Iowa
law required, then as now, only that a child complete eighth
grade, or reach the age of 16, whichever happened first. ^ ^ The
Wisconsin children had completed eighth grade in public
school.''* Thus, Wisconsin v. Yoder is not a case in which regula-
tion of private schools was at stake. Instruction of Amish chil-
dren by certified teachers was not an issue either. The court in
Yoder expanded the analysis that is used by the courts when
plaintiffs contend that free exercise of religion is violated.^'' The
result of Yoder was a judicial exemption from attending high
school for Amish.78 ¡^ keeping with the Court's conclusion that
few other groups could make the required showing, the out-
come in other cases is usually different from Yoder.''^
In Iowa in 1986-87, 520 children attended twenty-nine
Amish and conservative Mennonite schools. Twenty-four of
the twenty-nine schools were "Old Order" or "house Amish."
The schools were located in only nine of Iowa's ninety-nine
counties. Johnson County contained more Amish schools than
72. The committee was appointed in 1967. The religious exemption enacted
by the legislature (1967 Iowa Acts, ch. 248, § 1, codified as Imva Code § 299.24
[1987]), follows the pattern in the exemption from Social Security taxes
which the Amish enjoy. See 26 U.S.C. 1402(g).
73. See Erickson, "Showdown at an Amish Schoolhouse."
74. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207.
75. Iowa Code §§ 299.1, 299.2(2) (1987).
76. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 207.
77. The court used a variety of phrases, such as "central religious concepts,"
"the claims must be rooted in religious beliefs," and "this command '\s funda-
mental to the Amish faith" (emphasis added). Ibid, at 210, 215.
78. Ibid, at 234.
79. Ibid, at 235-36. The cases listed in n. 88 below involved application of
the Yoder analysis. See also the Iowa cases discussed below.
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any other county. The children are tested annually, and individ-
ual scores are examined to determine whether children are
making progress. The educational program is meager. The
teachers are noncertified members of the Amish or Mennonite
community who have completed eighth grade. In many
instances the schools are housed in the same buildings that
served as the public school prior to reorganization.^"
The Amish and Mennonite communities survive. There
may be widespread confusion about the differences between
the Old Order Amish and the Mennonites. The religious faith
and practices of the two groups are closely related. The evi-
dence presented in the Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton case
(1987) included an explanation of the differences by a person
who had grown up in the large Amish-Mennonite settlement
about fifteen miles southwest of Iowa City, in and around
Kalona.^' The theology or beliefs of the two groups is similar,
but the Old Order Amish continue to live in the fashion
described in detail in Wisconsin v. Yoder. One difference is the
attitude about education. Mennonite children attend public
schools, including high school; many go on to college, includ-
ing denominational schools such as Goshen College in Indiana.
The Mennonites do not resist state regulation; in fact there is a
state-approved Mennonite high school in the Kalona area.^ ^
Even though the Mennonites and Old Order Amish live in the
same communities, it was Old Order Amish who sought the
exemption from attendance at public schools in the wake of
reorganization requirements.
SINCE THE LATE 1970s, it has been mostly fundamentalist
Baptists and those called home schoolers who have challenged
80. State of Iowa, Department of Education, Report on Religious Groups
Exempted from School Standards and the Compulsory Education Law (1986-
1987), 3-6. The Old Order Aniish are often referred to as "house" Amish
because they hold their church services in homes.
81. The testimony by Ned Miller is in volume 11 of the transcript of the trial
in Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, discussed below.
82. The Iowa Mennonite School is among the approved non-public schools
listed in the Iowa Educational Directory for the 1987-88 school year pub-
lished by the Iowa Department of Education. The school has an estimated
enrollment of 145 in grades nine through twelve.
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Iowa's compulsory attendance law.^ ^ Bills to amend the law
have been introduced repeatedly. Vigorous lobbying efforts by
fundamentalist groups and those who wish to educate children
at home failed until 1988 to produce statutory changes. The
Iowa efforts are a part of a nationwide wave of challenges,
often in cases with the same lawyers, the same witnesses, the
same pleadings, the same issues.^*
The first Iowa case. State v. Moorhead (1981), established
that if a child of compulsory school age was not in public
school, it is an affirmative defense for the parent to show at trial
that the child was "receiving equivalent instruction by a certi-
fied teacher elsewhere." The court also said that section 299.1
of the Iowa Code was not vague, citing the educational stan-
dards section which lists the subjects that are required to be
taught in Iowa public schools.^^
The Charles City litigation followed. The parties stipulated
the issues to be decided, at least fifty-eight issues, which the
district court meticulously ruled on in an eighty-page order. The
issues included definition of the term school, freedom of associ-
ation and assembly, right of privacy, right to direct the educa-
tion and upbringing of a child, self-incrimination, free exercise,
establishment clause, overbreadth, vagueness, equal protec-
tion, and undue delegation. In addition, numerous statutory
construction problems were considered. The trial took nine
days in the fall of 1982. The judicial review of denial of the reli-
gious exemption by the State Board of Education was decided
separately but in the same order as the other issues of the
declaratory judgment action. The district court rejected each
challenge to Iowa law.»^ An appeal followed but not on all the
issues decided by the district court.
83. The court outlined the history of the challenge to state regulation by
church schools in Maine in Bangor Baptist Church v. State of Maine, 576 F.
Supp. 1299 (D. Maine 1983). Prior to 1979 the schools had been state
approved. Ibid, at 1303.
84. The court acknowledged the identity of issues, witnesses, and counsel in
Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 488 (8th Cir. 1987).
85. State v. Moorhead, 308 N.W.2d 60, 63, 64 (Iowa 1981).
86. Johnson v. Charles City Community Schools Board of Education, Floyd Co.
Dist. Co. No. 22891. The ruling is a public record and is in the appendix to
the case in the State of Iowa Law Library record of the case on appeal.
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The Iowa Supreme Court's decision, Johnson v. Charles City
Com. Sch. Dist. (1985), acknowledged Iowa's long tradition of
friendly coexistence between private and public schools. It cited
Pierce and other cases for the notion that the state has not only
the authority but also the duty to impose reasonable regula-
tions for the control and duration of basic education.^^ That
decision was consistent with dozens of other cases that have
been decided by courts in Nebraska, North Dakota, Michigan,
and many other states. Such cases have upheld the requirement
that children be taught by certified teachers. Until recently, few
challenges have addressed specific requirements regarding the
subject matter to be taught; most recent cases have been chal-
lenges to any regulation of private schools.^*
The Iowa court interpreted the religious exemption nar-
rowly in denying the plaintiffs' right to exemption from the
compulsory attendance law. Unlike the Amish, who live in a
separate agrarian society, the court found that the plaintiff's
children would "live, compete for jobs, work, and move about
in a diverse and complex society."^' The United States Supreme
Court refused to hear the application for review of the denial of
the so-called Amish exemption.^°
While the Charles City case worked its way through the
state courts, another case. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton,
was pending in the federal district court. It was brought by an
association of twenty-two schools. By trial time, the named
plaintiffs were two churches, pastors, instructors, parents, and
children. The case was tried in September 1985, after the Iowa
Supreme Court had decided Charles City. In most respects, the
twelve-day trial was a rerun of the Charles City case, as Judge
87. Johnson v. Charles City Com. Sch. Dist., 368 N.W.2d 74, 77, 79 (Iowa
1985), cert, denied sub nom., 474 U.S. 1033 (1985).
88. See, for example. State v. Patzer, 382 N.W.2d 631 (N.D. 1986) cert, denied,
479 U.S. 825; Sheridan Road Baptist v. Department of Education, 396 N.W.2d
373 (Mich. 1986); Attorney General v. Bailey, 386 Mass. 367, 436 N.E.2d 139,
cert, denied, 459 U.S. 970 (1982); State v. Rivinius, 328 N.W.2d 220 (N.D.
1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1070 (1983); Nebraska ex rel. Douglas v. Faith Bap-
tist Church, 207 Neb. 802, 301 N.W.2d 571, appeal dismissed, 454 U.S. 803
(1981); State v. Shaver, 294 N.W.2d 883 (N.D. 1980).
89. Charles City, 368 N.W.2d at 83-84.
90. Pruessner v. Benton, 474 U.S. 1033.
The Nature of the Wall 107
William C. Stuart indicated in his decision. There were, how-
ever, three notable distinctions. First, the court found that the
term equivalent instruction was unconstitutionally vague "with-
out further definition." Second, statistical evidence was intro-
duced concerning the results of investigations of child abuse.
The legislature that spring had amended the statute to include
teachers as mandatory child abuse reporters. The evidence
showed that except for law enforcement personnel, certified
school personnel have the highest percentage of "founded child
abuse reports." Thus, a health and safety component was added
to the compelling interest of the state in requiring children to be
taught by certified teachers. Further, the importance of certified
teachers as a means to identify children in need of special edu-
cation was added to the list of interests served by the law.''
The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit; a cross appeal of the vagueness holding was
filed; and the Keokuk school district cross appealed the denial
of attorney fees. At the time of briefing and oral argument to
the circuit court, the new department of education rules on
equivalent instruction had taken effect.'^ The state and the
school district argued that Judge Stuart's vagueness ruling was
moot. In a very strongly worded decision, the circuit court
affirmed the district court decision except that the denial of
attorney fees was reversed and remanded. Cranting of attorney
fees to defendants is not a frequent occurrence, but the Eighth
Circuit described the case against the Keokuk school district as
"vexatious and unreasonable." The case was also remanded for
a determination as to whether the new departmental rules had
cured the vagueness of the statute.^^
91. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 620 F. Supp. 308,316,318 (S.D. Iowa
1985). The mandatory child abuse reporting was acknowledged by the
Eighth Circuit opinion on appeal. See Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815
R2d 485, 495 (8th Cir. 1987). Certified teachers were added to the class of
persons who are mandatory child abuse reporters by 1985 Iowa Acts, ch.
173, §§ 3-5, codified as Iowa Code § 232.69(1) (b) (1987).
92. Iowa Admin. Code 670-63.1-.4 (1987); renumbered in 1988 to 281-
31.1-.4 (1988).
93. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 815 F.2d 485, 498-500 (8th Cir.
1987).
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Judge Stuart's decision on remand echoed the Pierce-
Meyer-Yoder doctrine. He ruled that the new regulations
avoided the constitutional prohibition against vagueness but
were not so extensive that the free exercise of religion was
unduly burdened. The court found that "the new standards
provide sufficient notice to private schools of how to comply
with the minimum regulations and provide sufficiently explicit
standards for those who enforce it."'* Thus the Iowa law, as fur-
ther defined by departmental rules, has passed all the constitu-
tional tests that have been presented.^^
An Iowa Supreme Court decision. State v. Trucke (1987),
complicated the Iowa picture. During the period between the
ruling that "equivalent education" was vague and the effective
date of the new rules, Greg and Karen Trucke were convicted
for failing to have their children taught by a certified teacher. A
divided court ruled that the parents had not yet committed a
crime and dismissed the charges. The decision meant that par-
ents could not be prosecuted until the point was reached in a
school year when children could not still be provided with 120
days of education. Put another way, parents could not be prose-
cuted under the Trucke ruling until after March 11,1988, for the
1987-88 school year. This conclusion is based on the court's
statement that "excluding weekends and holidays, the Tnickes
still had approximately 220 days left in the year to comply with
the statute." In an exceptionally vigorous dissent, three justices
said, "The compulsory education law is thus completely gut-
ted." Trucke, however, was not a constitutional case; it was based
on omission of an essential element of the crime from the
charging instrument.^^
What, then, is the existing reality with respect to com-
pulsory attendance law in Iowa? The Iowa compulsory edu-
cation law has been upheld against constitutional attacks,
the one defect having been cured by rules. A statutory inter-
94. Fellowship Baptist Church v. Benton, 678 F. Supp. 213, 214 (S.D. Iowa
1988).
95. See Johnson v. Charles City; State v. Moorhead; and Fellowship Baptist
Church, 620 F. Supp. 308, 815 F.2d 485, and 678 F Supp. 213.
96. State v. Trucke, 410 N.W.2d 242-45 (Iowa 1987).
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pretation increased the pressure on the legislature to amend
the Iowa law.
The school census statute, a statute that preceded the
attendance law, was repealed in 1986.'^ In repealing the school
census statute requirement, the General Assembly did not
delete the reference to the school census in the compulsory
education law. Until 1931 the school census was taken annu-
ally; thereafter it was required every other year.^ ^ The school
census had served two purposes since 1902: it facilitated plan-
ning, and it served as a tool for a school district to carry out its
mandated responsibility to enforce the compulsory education
law. A school district official could compare the school census
list with the list of students enrolled in the public school and the
list of students in reports received from private schools. From
that comparison, it could be determined what children were not
attending school as the first step in identifying children who
were "apparently truant," and whose parents might be subject
to prosecution.^^ The 1988 session of the legislature deleted the
reference to the school census in the Iowa Code. Subsequently,
school officers "shall ascertain the number of children over
seven and under sixteen years of age, in their respective dis-
tricts, the number of such children who do not attend school,
and so far as possible the cause of the failure to attend." How-
ever, no mechanism is provided for implementing the duty to
"ascertain" the number of such children.i°°
Without a school census the capability to identify all chil-
dren in the district does not exist.i°^ Admittedly, a biennial cen-
sus becomes outdated, although it is better than nothing. There
are concerns lurking in the background: How do school districts
97. 1986 Iowa Acts, ch. 1016, § 8, repealed Iowa Code Supp. § 291.9 (1985).
The original school census statute is in Iowa Code § 2764 (1897).
98. 1931 Iowa Acts, ch. 91, § 2, changed the requirement from "each year" to
"each even numbered year." Cf. Iowa Code § 291.9 (1985).
99. Iowa Code §§ 299.3, 299.11, 299.15 (1987).
100. 1988 Iowa Acts, ch. 1134, § 65.
101. State aid to Iowa schools is based on the number of students enrolled in
school on the second Friday of September. Iowa Code § 442.4 (1987). A
weighting system grants extra state aid for special education students, among
others. Iowa Code §§ 442.7-.54 (1987). The school aid formula was substan-
tially altered by the 1989 General Assembly.
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plan? How do they project future enrollment? How do they
enforce compulsory education? How can the State of Iowa meet
its contractual obligations with the federal government to pro-
vide special education for all children in need of a "free appro-
priate special education"? '^'^  What about future lawsuits by chil-
dren, when they reach majority, based on the failure of the
school district to see that the child has been provided with edu-
cation, a liberty and property interest?'°^
The church schools in Charles City, Keokuk, and Marshall-
town that lost the cases discussed above continue to operate.
"Homeschooler" organizations claim that hundreds of families
in Iowa are educating children at home. No one knows how
many Iowa children are not receiving education of any kind.
No one knows how many children receive only marginal edu-
cation. Improved standards for public schools are adopted.^"*
Higher pay is granted teachers.^°^ But the benefits of those
changes are for the children whose parents cause them to
attend public school or approved private schools.
Since Yoder was decided, the United States Supreme
Court has refused to hear dozens of cases that challenge state
compulsory education laws, including laws that are stricter
than Iowa's.^"^ No compulsory education cases have been
decided by the Iowa Supreme Court since Trucke. Only one
appeal of such a case is pending as of June 1, 1989.^'"' Consti-
102. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(1).
103. The U.S. Supreme Court has said that "denial of education to some
isolated groups of children poses an affront to one of the goals of the Equal
Protection Clause: the abolition of governmental barriers presenting unrea-
sonable obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual merit." Plyler v.
Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1982). The lack of knowledge of the existence of
children who are not attending school for any reason and the lack of
enforcement of compulsory education laws has the same effect for children
as the Texas law at issue in Plyler, which kept undocumented alien children
out of Texas schools.
104. 1986 Iowa Acts, ch. 1245, § 1411.
105. 1987 Iowa Acts, ch. 224.
106. See nn. 58 and 88 above.
107. Pursuant to Iowa Code § 13.2(1) (1987), all appellate cases in which the
State of Iowa is a party are handled by the Office of the Iowa Attorney Gen-
eral. This statement is made pursuant to cases on the docket of the Attorney
General in May 1989. On May 17, 1989, the Iowa Supreme Court did
decide, for the first time, that the compulsory education law is not the only
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tutional challenges have been defeated. The compelling ques-
tion continues to be: How many Iowa children are not being
educated? We do not know.
EPILOGUE
THE IOWA GENERAL ASSEMBLY, in the final days of the
1988 session, amended the compulsory education law. A new
paragraph was added to section 299.1 of the Iowa Code in
apparent response to the State v. Trucke decision. As before, the
required period of attendance for children of compulsory
school age was at least 120 days each school year; the amend-
ment provided that the "requirement shall be met by attending
for at least thirty days each school quarter, or a similar distribu-
tion of attendance throughout the school year." The reporting
requirements for parents who place a child under "private
instruction" were expanded to include an outline of the course
of study, including weekly lesson plans, tests used, the name
and address of the instructor, and time spent on the different
areas of curriculum. The penalty for violation of the law was
reduced to "not more than forty hours of unpaid community
service instead of any fine or imprisonment." Prosecutions of
violators were deferred "until after July 1, 1989, unless the par-
ent, guardian, or custodian fails to meet the requirements of sec-
available process for taking action against parents who do not send their chil-
dren to school. The court ruled, in the case. In the Interest ofB.B. v. the State of
Iowa, No. 88-1348 (Iowa 1989), that a child was in need of assistance because
the parents had failed to exercise a reasonable degree of care in supervising
the child as provided by Iowa Code section 232.2(6)(c)(2)(1987). That section
appears in the chapter of the Iowa Code that is commonly known as the
CHINA law. The child, who had been identified as a child in need of special
education, had been kept home from school for most of three years. The par-
ents claimed illness, but the court found no medical evidence that would sup-
port such an extended absence, and the parents had not sought a health
exemption as provided by law. The case is important for a number of reasons,
including the identification of education as a factor to be considered in deter-
mining what is in the best interest of a child. Further, CHINA is not a criminal
statute, so the court may construct a variety of remedies that range up to
removing a child from the custody of parents. What impact the new decision
will have on the efforts of school officials to make certain that children of
compulsory school age will attend school is difficult to predict. It is clear,
however, that the decision marks a major change in Iowa law.
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tion 299.4" (the reporting requirements outlined above; empha-
sis added). Finally, the Iowa legislative council was requested to
establish an interim study committee to conduct a comprehen-
sive study of the existing compulsory education law and to
develop recommendations to submit to the 1989 General
Assembly. The legislation was publicized generally as a "mora-
torium" on all enforcement of the compulsory education law
even though it was not a total ban on prosecutions.^"^
The partial moratorium expired July 1, 1989. The 1989
General Assembly did not further amend the compulsory edu-
cation law. Given the policy that requires strict construction of
criminal statutes, the 1988 amendments may have created new
problems, aside from the temporary and partially deferred
prosecutions.^''^ For example, the language in the law that par-
ents "shall cause the child to attend," was changed to "shall
enroll the child in some public school.""" That change in the
law may produce an issue of whether it is the child rather than
the parent who is subject to prosecution. It is clear that consid-
eration of compulsory education law is not over in Iowa.
108. 1988 Iowa Acts, ch. 1259.
109. For the requirement for strict construction of criminal statutes, see, for
example. State v. Oldfather, 306 N.W.2d 760, 764 (Iowa 1981).
110. Cf. the first sentence of Iowa Code § 299.1 (1987), and 1988 Iowa Acts,
ch. 1259 (emphasis added).

